The Great Unspoken Danger

Yesterday, the U.S. House Committee on Financial Services conducted a preliminary hearing into the investigation of regulatory failure associated with the $50 billion Madoff Hedge Fund fraud.  Among those testifying was Leon M. Metzger, a Yale University professor and expert on hedge fund management.  His commentary included the following:

I wish to stress two things: first, the need for top-notch internal controls and second, that operational risk is the great unspoken danger.   A 2003 study of 100 hedge fund failures over a 20 year period concluded that 50 percent of hedge funds had failed due to operational risk...  When I was interviewed in August 2004 about teaching a hedge funds course at the Yale School of Management, I said that I wanted to emphasize good operational controls, which investors tend to overlook, and are essential to the success of an investment.  I was offered the job, and the importance of those controls is what I stress whenever and wherever I teach.  

Many risk experts fail to recognize the importance of strong internal controls, but they are (to use a football analogy) the "blocking and tackling" of risk management.  Without a solid internal control framework, any hedge fund, financial institution or corporation is likely to suffer a similar demise.  Wheelhouse Advisors can provide a no-cost diagnostic review of your internal control structure.  Visit www.WheelhouseAdvisors.com to learn more.

SEC "Office of One" Ignores Massive Fraud

Some of you may recall previous posts regarding the SEC's office of risk management that contained only one staffer for many years.  Well, according to the Wall Street Journal, the one person office was notified earlier this year about Bernard Madoff's massive Ponzi scheme and did nothing to investigate.  The article details the many attempts of Harry Markopolos to alert the SEC to the fraud.  Mr. Markopolos final attempt was made to the head of risk management at the SEC, Jonathan Sokobin.   Here is the account of that attempt:

Early this year, Mr. Markopolos made one last major effort after receiving an email from Jonathan Sokobin, an official in the SEC's Washington, D.C., office whose job was to search for big market risks. Mr. Sokobin had heard about Mr. Markopolos and asked him to give him a call, according to an email exchange between them.  

Mr. Markopolos also sent Mr. Sokobin an email -- with the stark subject line "$30 billion Equity Derivative Hedge Fund Fraud in New York" -- saying an unnamed Wall Street pro recently pulled money from Mr. Madoff's firm after trying to confirm trades supposedly done in his account, but discovering that no such trades had been made.  It was his last try.  He never heard back about his allegations regarding Mr. Madoff.  "I felt pretty low," Mr. Markopolos recalls.  Mr. Sokobin, through an SEC spokesman, declined to comment.

To Mr. Sokobin's credit, he did reach out to Mr. Markopolos to investigate.  However, given the size of his office, it is not surprising he could not act quicker to bring the fraud to an end.  Greater evidence is not needed to justify more investment in risk management.